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Abstract
Standardized classroom economics experiments provide a treasure trove of evidence about
how well results reproduce when nearly-identical methods are used. We use a sample of around
20,000 observations to test reproducibility in bargaining and trading. Ultimatum bargaining
exhibits some geographical variation, and shows that equal split offers are accepted more often
and more quickly than slightly unequal offers. Double auction results are highly reproducible
and are close to equilibrium predictions. Our large sample shows robust, strong correlations
between how individual surplus and trading order, and autocorrelation ( 0.5) of successive
price changes, consistent with trading dynamics based on limited rationality.
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One-sentence summary: In hundreds of classroom experiments, buyer-seller market results are
the same, but two-person bargaining outcomes vary.
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Economists and other social scientists generally search for lawful regularities in human behavior,
and the causes of those regularities. A prerequisite for lawful regularity is that when identical
methods are used by different scientists the results are roughly the same. However, testing for
regularity in this way is extremely challenging because even the most careful attempted replications
inevitably differ in some ways from original studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Camerer
et al., 2016, 2018).
To learn about the extent of regularity and difference in simple economic systems, we use data
from an educational technology platform (called MobLab). The platform offers highly standardized
interfaces and data collection. Software standardization is prized by instructors because it makes
teaching simpler. Standardized experimentation should also be prized by scientists because it fixes
the details of methods, to generate nearly-identical replications, except for differences associated
with different student demographics and classroom experiences (Zwaan et al., 2018).
We explore experimental regularity in two important domains of collective human behavior—
two-person bargaining, and centralized buyer-seller trade. The large data set enables us to draw
strong conclusions about how bargaining and centralized trade differ. It has been hypothesized
that two-person bargaining is “personal,” activating evolved concerns for fairness and reciprocity
from our ancestral life (Smith, 1998). These concerns could generate differences in bargaining
outcomes across different geographical settings, and even across types of classes and students due
to cultural norms about sharing and classroom exposure.
Centralized trade, in contrast, is thought to be “impersonal”: A market of people acting selfishly,
with no concern for fairness, can produce mutually-beneficial outcomes. As Adam Smith famously
said, “not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, 1776). Indeed, economic theory has
shown mathematically why concerns for fairness which influence two-person bargaining will have
no impact on large markets (Sobel, 2009; Dufwenberg et al., 2011). This sweeping hypothesis
suggests centralized buyer-seller trading experiments may produce nearly identical outcomes for
students all over the world.
Our data provide the most comprehensive test of regularity of behavior in experimental bargain-
ing and centralized trading using an identical protocol in many countries. The two major limits of
this approach are that subjects are all students in classes (in a narrow range of age and analytical
skill), and most of them are not incentivized by financial rewards, as is the norm in contempo-
rary experimental economics. In early studies (Chamberlin, 1948; Smith, 1962), however, subjects
were not incentivized for trades, but those unincentivized data were important in suggesting basic
principles about behavior in markets. It later became customary to pay subjects earnings linked
to experimental behavior, and to even pay a small “commission” for executing trades (since other-
wise marginal trades were not made; Plott and Smith, 1978). Summaries of different experiments
with within-experiment variation in no, medium, and high performance incentives have sometimes
shown decreased variability in response noise with incentive pay (Smith and Walker, 1993; Her-
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twig and Ortmann, 2001), although the most reliable differences from not paying come when a
response is socially desirable (e.g., taking more risk, or sharing money with strangers; Camerer
and Hogarth, 1999). Attempts to conduct the ultimatum game without monetary incentives, such
as Tompkinson and Bethwaite (1995), also find roughly similar results as when incentives are used
Güth et al. (1982). While we believe that incentive pay linked to choices is usually desirable in
economics experiments, the experimental platform simply did not impose this on instructors.
1 The Data
MobLab is an online educational platform for conducting economics experiments. Instructors sign
up on the MobLab website1 and invite students to participate in experiments from a large menu.
Instructors use the platform so that their students can participate personally in simple versions of
the kinds of games and markets the students are reading about in textbooks. The ultimatum game
and buyer-seller market are two of the most popular experiments. The popularity of these two
games gives ample observations (nearly 10,000 plays of each) and wide geo-demographic variation.
In each session of the ultimatum game, student players are randomly assigned to be a Proposer
or a Responder. The Proposer offers a share of a fixed amount (a “pie size”) to the Responder.
The Responder can accept the offer or reject it; if it is rejected both players get zero. The actual
screens that subjects see are shown in Figures 1A and 1B. For each session, the instructor can
specify the number of periods each pair plays together, and the pie size. The most common pie
size is the default setting, which is 100 units (used in 82% of pairs). The modal number of plays
by each pair is 1 and the average is 1.615, and we have a total of 10,507 observations (Figure 1E).
In every market session of the double auction, student players are divided randomly into two
subgroups, buyers and sellers. Each buyer (seller) gets information about the private values (costs)
of the goods that they can trade before entering the market. Figures 1C and 1D show their screens.
Values and costs are induced artificially (Smith, 1976). For example, a buyer might be told that
if they buy a unit they can redeem it for, say, $3. A seller might be told they can keep the money
they sell a unit for minus a cost of $1. In those examples, the buyer and seller should trade at a
price between $1 and $3; if they do trade they create a “surplus” of $2. The players can use a slider
bar to post a bid to buy one unit of the good (or post an ask to sell), which is then displayed for
all players to see. Players may also trade by clicking a button to buy or sell at a current bid or ask
price. To limit mistakes, if a player chooses a potential bid or ask that brings negative profit (based
on their induced value or cost), the slider bar turns red as a warning. Instructors can specify any
market configuration of values and costs they like. However, the default configuration (described
in Section 3) is the most common setting (used in 36% of the markets). We have a total of 9,023
observations from 5,809 markets for the double auction (Figure 1F), after excluding one market
session due to extremely low efficiency.2
1https://www.moblab.com/
2See Appendix B for details of this market session. Including this market session obviously affects the efficiency
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2 Ultimatum Games
The ultimatum game is a simple form of take-it-or-leave-it bargaining (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer,
2003; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). If all players care only about their own payoffs, Responders should
accept any positive proposal offer (and maybe even zero). Proposers who anticipate that behavior
by Responders should offer the smallest amount (or zero). As has been observed in many previous
studies, this extreme prediction is far from what the student players (and other human subjects)
commonly do.
Some Responders reject positive offers, even though they know they will get less money. There
does not appear to be strong learning over repeated plays of ultimatum games (even against the
same partner) to accept offers in general. There is evidence of a tendency to accept higher offers
and reject lower offers more frequently over time (Cooper and Dutcher, 2011).
The most prominent explanation for rejection of offers is that Responders are willing to sacrifice
earnings to reduce disadvantageous inequality, which results if they get less than the Proposer
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). However, a distaste for inequality does not
seem to be sole explanation because Responders are more likely to reject small offers when they
are made by a human Proposer, rather than by a computer or disinterested third-party (Blount,
1995), indicating negative reciprocity toward people who have treated them unfairly (Rabin, 1993;
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
Selfish Proposers who anticipate Responders’ rejections of small offers should make strategic
offers that are large enough to avoid rejection. Proposers might also make large generous offers
if they are altruistic, although most evidence suggests Proposers are approximately maximizing,
given expectations of rejection by inequality-averse or reciprocal Responders (Forsythe et al., 1994;
Levine, 1998).
Figure 2A and 2B shows distributions of Proposer offers, and acceptance rates for different offers
in our sample. The distribution of offers shows clear multimodal spikes at multiples of tens, most
frequently at 50%. This result echoes with past results showing that focal points play a significant
role of determining the bargaining outcomes (Roth, 1985). The acceptance rate of Responders
increases almost monotonically with the size of the proposal offer (except for a slight downward
trend for those rare hyperfair offers of more than 50%).
One feature of behavior in these ultimatum games is that there is something special about offers
of exactly 50% (this is only statistically clear because of the large volume of data). A piecewise
linear regression of acceptance probability as a linear function of offers, with a break at 50%,
shows a highly significant discontinuous jump in acceptance at 50% in both the one-shot game and
repeated games (one-shot 16.3%, t = 10.84, p-value < 0.001; repeated 26.2%, t = 9.40, p-value
< 0.001). The jump is robust to fitting a quadratic acceptance rate curve (see Appendix A.1).3
results, but not the other results.
3The discontinuous drop immediately after 50% is insignificant in both one-shot games and repeated games with
p-value = 0.188 and 0.557, respectively. This is in contrast to Backus et al. (2018) who find equal-split offers treated
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Another feature our data can show is the effect of conducting experiments in different classes.
Figure 2C shows the regression coefficients for class dummies when predicting proposal offers
controlling for various configurations (see Appendix A.3). We find that only advanced elective
classes in economics significantly reduce proposal offers (students in these classes are also likely
to major in economics). In game theory and political economy classes, proposer offers are lower
by more than 5% (from an average of 40.04%). In contrast, in experimental and behavioral
economics and management/finance classes proposal offers are lower by only 2–3.2%. Our results
are consistent with Bauman and Rose (2011) who find lower charity donation caused by self-
selection for students majoring in economics, not but “indoctrination” of non-majors in those
classes. While our data cannot show whether more economics training reduces proposal offers
because of self-selection or causality, it, nevertheless, shows a correlation.
The MobLab platform also records how long it takes subjects to make decisions (their reaction
times, or RTs). The Responders’ RTs indicate the special appeal of equal-split offers: there is a
drastic drop in the time Responders take to make a decision when they face an offer of 50%, say,
compared to 49% (see Figure 2D and Appendix A.4). For one-shot games, Responders’ average
RT drops from 13.5 seconds to 8.9 seconds when they are facing an equal-split offer compared to
49% offers. As acceptance rates increases proportionally to offer size, we also find an inverted-U
shape in RT as acceptance rate increases from 40% to 100%, peaking at 55-60%. This relationship
shows that, at the population level, the Responders’ RT locally peaks at where they are indifferent
with accepting and rejecting the offer and drops at where they have the highest acceptance rate.
This pattern is consistent with a growing body of literature about inferring preferences from RT
(Chabris et al., 2009; Konovalov and Krajbich, 2017). Furthermore, our population-level result is
consistent with Krajbich et al. (2014), though their discrete-offer design is not capable of detecting
the sharp drop at exactly 50%.
The frequency of exactly 50% splits, and the speed and jump in acceptance, is not consistent
with typical models of inequity aversion or reciprocity—giving 49% rather than 50%, for example,
should not lead to a jump in rejections. However, models with social image concerns can produce
equilibria with statistical concentrations around an exact 50-50 norm. This type of model is con-
sistent with our data, and is consistent with other data on dictator lab experiments (Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009) and the frequency of exactly equal sharing in bequests (Bernheim and Severinov,
2003) and in invention royalty sharing (Kotha et al., 2018).
Roth et al. (1991) (hereafter RPOZ) is an early study which explored differences in ultimatum
games across four countries. Appendix A.2 compares offer distributions and acceptance in their
four countries and in our sample. The general patterns are similar, but they do not detect a
discontinuous jump in acceptance rate for 50% offers (the jump is only 4.5%).
differently in alternating-offer bargaining.
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3 Buyer-Seller Double Auctions
Centralized markets, in which buyers and sellers compete impersonally, are the major building
blocks of theoretical microeconomics. Such markets also represent how much of the trading in
developed economies is actually organized.
Some of the earliest economic experiments showed that even with a small numbers of traders
on each side of the market, traders can arrive at mutually beneficial trades as long as there is
centralized exchange of information about prices and trading opportunities—called “price discov-
ery” (Smith, 1962; Plott and Smith, 1978). The key idea used to analyze these experiments is the
familiar “competitive equilibrium” (CE). The CE price is the price at which the number of units
bought equals the number sold (the intersection of supply and demand curves). In the markets
created by MobLab, in CE the traders are collectively maximizing the sum of profit (“producer’s
surplus”) and consumer surplus, which is the total net value of goods purchased minus prices paid.
Figure 3A shows the most common supply-demand design in our dataset. It has five buyers and
five sellers who can each trade up to three units.4 The CE price range is [110, 114] with a midpoint
of 112, and generates 13 units of trade. Note that these CE price and quantity predictions are
based on no free behavioral parameters: They rely only on the behavioral assumptions that no
traders think they can manipulate the price by themselves (called “price taking”), and on some
imagined process of price adjustment leading to CE. The CE predictions could easily be wrong for
many reasons: Traders might prefer to trade at round numbers, they might trade too impulsively or
wait too long, or buyer and seller groups could, in principle, collude among themselves to withhold
trade and manipulate prices. Furthermore, as we note in more detail below, standard proofs about
CE generally rely on the assumption that there are large numbers of traders on both sides of the
market. There is no proof that convergence to CE will occur with small numbers of traders, who
may strategically anticipate price-setting by others.
Figure 3A shows 10 time series of trade prices for four consecutive trading periods, one from each
geographical region. The average price is fairly close to the predicted CE, but the dynamic process
varies across different markets. Although the dynamics are all different, two general features arise:
First, the volatility of price change decreases in the later periods. Second, regardless of initial
transactions, the last price seems indicative of the equilibrium price.
In Figure 3B, we analyze the relation between price volatility and allocation efficiency.5 We
4In our buyer-seller double auction, each bid or ask is only for a single unit of the commodity, which is different
from multiple unit double auction that the players can trade multiple units at one time.
5Efficiency is defined as E ⌘  PNi=1 ⇡i / PNi=1 ⇡Ci  , where N is the number of commodities can be traded, ⇡i
is the realized profit and ⇡Ci is the CE profit of good i.
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measure price volatility with Smith’s alpha,6 and find an average of 0.278 (S.D. = 0.294), ranging
from 0.136 in China to 0.393 in Canada, while community college students yield 0.534. Efficiency
is 81.5% (S.D. = 0.258) ranging from 72.7% in England to 86.0% in Spain, although community
college students achieve only 69.5%. Conceptually, if the price fluctuates dramatically, it is pos-
sible that some traders who should not trade that unit in equilibrium can transact at a profit
under extreme price levels. Either the buyer/seller on the other end of the trade is trading at a
loss, or this transactor will crowd out another who should trade in equilibrium, decreasing effi-
ciency. Subsequently, there should be a negative correlation between Smith’s Alpha and efficiency
(see Figure 3B), though this can only be shown in large data sets with many markets. Indeed,
the correlation coefficient is  0.079 (p-value < 0.001) for our data. When considering repeated
markets after more than three periods of trading (n = 469 from 317 markets), the correlation
coefficient is much stronger at  0.409 (p-value < 0.001). This indicates that experience with the
same supply-demand schedule helps players identify and exploit arbitrage opportunities during
price fluctuations. Fitting an exponential convergence model proposed by Gjerstad (2007) (see
Appendix B.2) predicts Smith’s alpha dropping from 0.206 to 0.086 if students were to play 25
periods, but efficiency remains stable at about 92% across periods.
We compare our results to Ketcham et al. (1984) to examine the consistency of our results
to previously published laboratory experimental studies. Their Design I consists of four buyers
and four sellers who each have a demand or supply of three units and repeatedly trade in the
same continuous double auction market for 25 periods. They report an efficiency level of 95.89%
(in periods 7 to 9) and an asymptotic Smith’s alpha of 5.9%. In our data, these numbers are
estimated to be 92.08% (in period 7) and 8.6% (in period 25, their last period).
Although the data show that most of the available surplus can be harvested by the double
auction, efficiency losses are still common across markets. To analyze the sources of inefficiency,
we adopt the same approach as Cason and Friedman (1996) and decompose the efficiency losses to
two different types: transactions involving extra-marginal trades (EM-inefficiency) and profitable
trades that are not realized (V-inefficiency). In our data, 47.4% of the losses are from extra-
marginal trades and the rest are from unrealized profitable trades. In Cason and Friedman (1996),
55.8-67.8% of the loss is from extra-marginal trades. This implies both EM-inefficiency and V-
inefficiency are prominent, though the higher rate of unrealized trades in our classroom data,
compared to Cason and Friedman (1996), may be due to the lack of financial stakes.
Within a period, in order to quantify the heterogeneity in the initial prices and the convergence
of ending price, we adopt the convergence model developed by Noussair et al. (1995):
yit = (1/t)Xi ·  1 + (1  1/t) 2 + ✏it,
6The Smith’s alpha measures the price change volatility in a market of Q transactions, and is defined as
↵ ⌘
q
1
Q
PQ
q=1(Pq   PC)2
PC
,
where PC is the equilibrium price and Pq is the actual price of each transaction. This was first proposed by Smith
(1962), who also set PC to be the midpoint of the CE price range.
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where i indicates the particular period of market, t represents time as measured by the transaction
order, Xi is a vector containing the information about that market period, and  1 explains the
origin of the possible dynamic process. Therefore,  2 is the asymptote of the dependent variable.
As t becomes larger, the weight of  1 becomes smaller because 1/t approaches 0 while the weight
of  2 increases as (1  1/t) approaches to 1. We take the standardized price difference as the de-
pendent variable.7 Figure 3C is the coefficient plot and the full regression table is in Appendix B.1.
Although the initial price is on average 15.3% higher than the equilibrium price with subtle hetero-
geneity, the final price converges to only 1.7% higher than the equilibrium price, within the range
of  2.9% to 1.9% reported in Ketcham et al. (1984).
Figure 3D provides a scatter plot (in log-scale) for the actual observed quantity and the pre-
dicted equilibrium quantity within each of the market experiments. Each dot represents one
experimental trading period. An ordinary least squares regression line has a slope that is close
to the identity trend line (R2 = 0.760, slope  ˆ = 0.967 and clustered S.E. = 0.012), but with a
significant downward shift of 10.0% (p-value = 0.004). There is a little less trading than predicted
(which is common in early periods of previous incentivized lab experiments also), Smith (1962)
also finds slightly less trading without monetary incentives and show how real incentives and small
trade commissions induce subjects to bid up to their values or costs.
The CE predicted price and quantity are rather accurate predictions of actual prices and quan-
tity. However, it has long been mysterious how the psychology and dynamics of trading over real
time actually leads to these market outcomes. Three prominent theories have been proposed for
within-period price formation, but have only been tested in small samples. In addition, Easley
and Ledyard (1993) propose a theory for between-period price formation, but also could not test
it very powerful due to data limitations. The volume of our data provides a powerful test of all
these important theories.
The three within-period dynamic theories range widely over how strategically sophisticated
players are assumed to be. From most sophisticated to least, one theory assumes Bayesian mutual
adjustment of trading strategies in an incomplete information game (Wilson, 1987, hereafter “Mu-
tual Adjustment”), a second theory simplifies by assuming traders do not strategize about other
traders’ strategies (Friedman, 1991, hereafter “Against Nature”), and a third theory proposed by
Gode and Sunder (1993) posits “zero-intelligence” traders who pay no attention to price history at
all and just bid randomly (while not losing money). See Appendix B.3 for details.
The three theories predict that the auto-correlation between successive price changes within
a trading period should be either zero, positive, or negative, respectively. The first two theories
also predict a clear correlation between how extreme a trader’s values or costs are, and when they
trade: The buyers and sellers who have the most to earn are predicted to trade the earliest. This
prediction corresponds to a negative correlation of value and trade order for buyers, and a positive
7The standardized price difference is defined as  q ⌘ (Pq   PC)/PC , where PC is the equilibrium price and Pq
is the actual price of each transaction with q 2 {1, ..., Q}.
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correlation of cost and trade order for sellers. Thus, all three theories can be tested by looking at
auto-correlation of price changes and correlation of value/cost and trade order.
Figures 4A and 4B show the distributions of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of the
buyer value and order of trade, and seller cost and order of trade. Each market period with at
least four transactions contributes one correlation.8 The average rank-order correlation coefficient
is ⇢Buyer =  0.539 (S.D. = 0.277) for buyers and ⇢Seller = 0.518 (S.D. = 0.279) for sellers. Hence,
unlike Cason and Friedman (1996) which find weak evidence, we find stronger support for the two
strategic theories (Wilson, 1987; Friedman, 1991), though zero-intelligence theory also suggests
high-value buyers and low-cost sellers will transact slightly earlier.
In addition, given the large volume of data, we are able to identify a decrease in the size of
this correlation when comparing period 1 to 3 with period 4 and beyond. In fact, buyer rank-
order correlation drops from ⇢1 3Buyer =  0.540 (S.D. = 0.277) to ⇢otherBuyer =  0.506 (S.D. = 0.275),
passing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with p-value = 0.006 (KS = 0.0826). Similarly, seller rank-
order correlation decreases from ⇢1 3Seller = 0.521 (S.D. = 0.278) to ⇢
other
Seller = 0.472 (S.D. = 0.299)
with p-value = 0.003 (KS = 0.0867). This provide the first large-scale evidence for the theory of
between-period price formation developed in Easley and Ledyard (1993).
Figure 4C is the scatter plot of price change from one trade to the next, plotted against the
lagged price change. Similar to the inexperience sessions of Cason and Friedman (1996), there is
a clear trade-by-trade negative auto-correlation, estimated to be  0.457 (R2 = 0.209,  ˆ =  0.491
with clustered S.E. = 0.007, ↵ˆ =  0.007 with clustered S.E. = 0.001), which is very close to the
prediction of  0.50 from the zero-intelligence theory and far from the prediction of the two other
theories.
Figure 4D reports all three correlations at once, showing a three-dimensional scatter plot in
the top-right along with the three-way view for buyer rank-order correlation, seller rank-order cor-
relation, and price change auto-correlation. Since there is no clear prediction for zero-intelligence
algorithm, we run 10,000 simulations in our default market to create a benchmark. Matching our
data with the 95% confidence region of zero-intelligence simulations and two other theoretical pre-
dictions, we find much stronger support for zero-intelligence theory, compared to earlier evidence of
Cason and Friedman (1996) and Cliff and Bruten (1998). However, a non-negligible portion of our
data falls outside of the 95% confidence region, pointing toward the other two more sophisticated
theories of price formation.
4 Heterogeneity
With data from around the globe, we are able to look into heterogeneity generated by geographical
differences. Specifically, we are interested in whether there is country variation in proposal offers
and acceptance rates in the ultimatum game, as well as in first and last transaction prices in
8This is because we need four transactions to calculate price change auto-correlation, leaving us with 8,492
markets.
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buyer-seller double auctions. In order to control for the experience and environment, we use the
data from the first period of the default configuration in the following analysis.
Conceptually, we want to analyze how subject pools differ in our data set. To quantify how
an average player/market would vary across different regions, we focus on the variation of “true
means” in different countries, instead of the variation in each player/market’s performance. To
achieve this goal, we treat each country’s data set as a different “study” (that estimates its country
mean) and conduct meta-analysis.
Specifically, we calculate the I2 proposed by Higgins et al. (2003) through the DerSimonian-
Laird random-effects model, commonly used in meta-analyses (DerSimonian and Laird, 1986):
I2 =
✓
Q  df
Q
◆
⇥ 100%
where df is the degree of freedom and Q is the weighted sum of squares (of each country’s deviation
from the true mean) weighted by the inverse-variance.9 If there is no heterogeneity across different
countries, df is the expected weighted sum of squares. Therefore, since Q is the observed weighted
sum of squares, I2 represents the fraction of variation attributed to between-country instead of
within-country heterogeneity (see Appendix C).
We find cross-country variation only for proposal offers in the ultimatum game, with 86.6% of
the heterogeneity coming from between-country heterogeneity. Figure 5A shows that, compared to
the average offer of 35, students in Spain make significantly lower offers of 25–30, while students in
Canada and South/West US make slightly more generous offers of 36–37.10 In contrast, acceptance
rates in the ultimatum game vary insignificantly across countries. Figure 5B shows that only 30.6%
of the heterogeneity stems from between-country variation, with no country yielding a significantly
different acceptance rate outcome. RPOZ also find cross-country variation in proposal offers, and
less variation in corresponding acceptance rates, although tests of both offers and acceptance do
not have strong power. They speculate this is due to culture differences in social norms regarding
acceptable offers that are well-understood and respected in each culture, so that offers vary more
than acceptances do. However, they acknowledge that their “conjecture must stand or fall on the
repeatability and robustness of these results" (p. 1092). Using thousands of classroom experiments,
we are able to demonstrate the repeatability and robustness of the same results in the ultimatum
game, as well as the universal effect of competition in the buyer-seller double auction. In fact, our
9Here we adopt the random-effect model, which assumes the true means for different countries are heterogeneous.
Moreover, the Q statistic is defined as
Q =
KX
k=1
wk
"
mk  
PK
k=1 wkmkPK
k=1 wk
#2
for wk =
1
s2k
where mk and sk are the sample mean and its standard error of country k, and K is the number of countries. See
Higgins and Thompson (2002) and appendix C for the details of estimation.
10However, all ultimatum game observations from Spain come from game theory classes, which itself induces
low proposal offers. Splitting the data, we find students in non-game theory classes have I2 = 56.97%, while
those in game theory classes result in I2 = 74.01%. In other words, more than half of the heterogeneity comes
between-country heterogeneity for both game theory and non-game theory classes.
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results of the double auction are even more robust, and exhibit little between-country difference in
both initial and final transaction prices (Figures 5C, 5D). In other words, we find little between-
country differences even for initial prices that are potentially influenced by culture differences.
5 Discussion
We live in a golden age of social science. There is a symbiotic growth in available data and in
development of methods for figuring out what the data tell us. The best new data sets have volume,
variety, and velocity. In our case, volume and variety of experimental economics data show some
interesting novel findings, and differences.
Our analysis demonstrates that experimental creations of two fundamental, but different, kinds
of economic activity—outcomes in two-person ultimatum bargaining and 10-person buyer-seller
trading—are closely reproducible in a large sample of classroom experiments. The behavior in
buyer-seller trading, in particular, should be considered as reproducible as the kinds of experi-
ments that are done in a college chemistry lab in order to demonstrate to students the regularity
of chemical reactions. In fact, regularly run classroom experiments serve as another venue of repli-
cation that repeats these classic economic experiments over and over, distinguishing them from
well-known experiments of other social sciences that have sometimes failed to replicate (Camerer
et al., 2016, 2018; Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014, forthcoming).
At the same time, Variability across classroom groups is consistent with the hypothesis that
bargaining is more personal, and hence has more variable outcomes, than impersonal competi-
tive market trading. This is not too surprising as local norms of fair sharing are expected to
affect outcomes. Indeed, games like these are now commonly used to study cross-cultural differ-
ences precisely because they are thought to reflect sharing norms, and perhaps influences such as
marketization and religion (Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2010a, 2005).
While there are between-country differences in bargaining offers and acceptances, differences
in market trading are very small. Indeed, the results from simple competitive buyer-seller trading
appear to be as close to a culturally universal, highly reproducible outcome as one is likely to get
in social science about collective behavior. This bold claim is limited, of course, by the fact that
all these data are high school and college students in classes in “WEIRD” societies (Henrich et al.,
2010b). Given this apparent robustness, it would next be useful to establish if emergence of CE
in small buyer-seller markets extends to small-scale societies, across the human life cycle, to adult
psychopathology and cognitive deficit, and even to other species.
One new observation is that in ultimatum game bargaining, three large differences occur for
offers of exactly half (compared to offers slightly below or above). At that offer level, there is a
sharp jump in offer frequency, a discontinuous jump in acceptance rates, and an unusual drop in
reaction times by Responders. The frequency of 50% offers has often been noted (Forsythe et al.,
1994; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1997), but the other two effects on acceptance rate and
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speed have not been established before.
Another important empirical observation we are able to make with substantial confidence is
the regularity of dynamics within a trading period, in buyer-selling trading markets. There is a
robust association between value and cost magnitudes and trading order, and a negative correlation
between successive price changes close to  0.50. Earlier exploratory studies have shown these
patterns, but without anywhere near the degree of confidence that comes from the volume of data
here. (For example, the price change auto-correlations are seen in every country and are extremely
close in magnitude; they range from  0.459 to  0.415.) These two empirical facts are accounted
for by a simple theory of random zero-intelligence trading. However, that theory makes a lot of
other counterfactual predictions—viz., there is no scope for learning across periods, so the simple
ZI model cannot explain the between-period convergence (as Easley and Ledyard (1993) do). So
there is room for improvement by adding more intelligence to that theory. Our data provide raw
evidence that can be immediately used to test any such theory, with extremely high statistical
power.
Besides the advantages which come from having a large volume and variety of data, the velocity
of new data accumulation is high. Broad conclusions such as ours can therefore be re-evaluated
rapidly, in years rather than decades. Educational platforms like MobLab which are continuously
churning out new (and standardized) data, and welcome improvements on all sorts of openness
and data sharing cheered on by journals, funding agencies and everyone else, will continue to make
more and better data available in the years ahead. Our analysis is one glimpse of how such data
can make the foundations of important aspects of social science sturdier and sturdier.
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(A) Proposer Screenshot (B) Responder Screenshot
(C) Buyer Screenshot (D) Seller Screenshot
# Observations in Ultimatum Game
(Pair x Period) N=10,507
Canada  
(1,057)
England  
(571)
Spain  
(562)
West  
(2,419)
Midwest  
(925)
South  
(2,970)
North East  
(1,431)
China  
(137)
Singapore 
(226)
Japan  
(209)
(E) Ultimatum Observations
# Observations in Double Auction
(Market x Period) N=9,023
Canada  
(1,664)
England  
(320)
Spain  
(28)
West  
(2,218)
Midwest  
(881)
South  
(2,547)
North East  
(1,038)
China  
(35) Japan  
(248)
Singapore 
(44)
(F) Double Auction Observations
Figure 1: Experimental interface screenshots and geographical distribution of observations. (A
and B) The Proposer’s and the responder’s screen in the ultimatum game. (C and D) The buyer
and the seller screens in the buyer-seller centralized trading markets. (E and F) The geographical
distribution of observations in ultimatum bargaining game and buyer-seller trading market sessions.
The number of observations in each country is in parentheses.
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Figure 2: Offers and acceptance rates in ultimatum game experiment. (A) The histogram of
proposal offers in one-shot games and repeated games (with a fixed partner protocol). (B) The
average acceptance rate for different proposal offer levels, and a piecewise linear regression allowing
a discontinuous change at 50%. The size of the dots represents the frequency of each offer amount.
(C) The point estimates and 95% CIs of estimated marginal effects of different classes on proposal
offers. The principles of economics is the reference group. (D) The LOWESS estimation of the
Responder’s RT in one-shot games.
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Figure 3: Design and results of buyer-seller double auctions. (A) There are 5 buyers and 5 sellers
who can each trade up to 3 units. The demand curve is the step function plotting the total number
of units buyers can afford to buy at different prices (darker line). It starts with one unit of demand
at the price of 150, and steps down to 15 units of demand at 108. The supply curve goes up from
a single unit of profitable supply at a price of 50, to 15 units of supply at 120 (lighter line). The
CE price range is [110, 114] with a midpoint of 112 and generates 13 units of trade. In periods 1-4,
each gray line plots real-time averaged time series data of trade prices for one of the 10 different
countries for the pictured default market configuration. The number of grey lines are 10, 8, 5,
and 2, since most classes play only one or two periods. (B) Joint and marginal distributions of
Smith’s alpha and efficiency. Regression lines are shown for periods 1 to 3 (black dashed line)
and for periods 4 and beyond (orange line). (C) The point estimates and 95% CIs of estimated
deviations in initial prices from the convergence model (where the standardized price difference is
the dependent variable). For example, in the community college sample prices tend to start higher
and in the high school sample prices tend to start lower. (D) A scatter plot of equilibrium and
empirical trading volume. The horizontal and vertical axis are the log of equilibrium and empirical
quantity, respectively. The black line is the 45 degree line and the orange dotted line is the linear
regression line (R2 = 0.760,  ˆ = 0.967 and clustered S.E. = 0.012).
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Figure 4: Statistical analysis of trading dynamics. Two statistics can be used to test three hy-
potheses about trading dynamics: Rank-order correlation and price change auto-correlation. (A)
The distribution of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between buyer’s value rank and trans-
action order. Each observation is one trading period: Orange for period 1 to 3 (N1 3 = 8, 052)
and hollow for period 4 and beyond (Nother = 440). The average rank-order correlation coefficient
is ⇢Buyer =  0.539 with p-value < 0.001 (⇢1 3Buyer =  0.540 and ⇢otherBuyer =  0.506). (B) The distri-
bution of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between seller’s cost rank and transaction order.
(orange: N1 3 = 8, 052, hollow: Nother = 440). The average rank-order correlation coefficient is
⇢Seller = 0.518 with p-value < 0.001 (⇢1 3Seller = 0.521 and ⇢
other
Seller = 0.472). (C) The scatter plot of the
trade-to-trade price change within a period, correlated with the lagged price change. The overall
trade-to-trade price change auto-correlation ⇢Price =  0.457; the linear regression line has a slope
of  0.491. (D) The 3-dimensional scatter plot and three-way view of ⇢Buyer, ⇢Seller and market-
level price change auto-correlation ⇢Price (with an average of  0.431). Theoretical predictions are
depicted in the 3-dimensional scatter plot for Mutual Adjustment (MA, green), Against Nature
(AN, orange) and Zero-Intelligence (ZI, blue). The figure on the top-left is the view from above.
The figure on the bottom-left is the perspective from the front, and the figure on the bottom right
shows what you will see from the right.
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Figure 5: Cross-country heterogeneity in economic bargaining and market behavior. (A) A plot
of the means and 95% CIs of the proposal offer deviations for different countries. (B) A plot
of the means and 95% CIs of difference in acceptance rates (ultimatum game logit regression
intercepts, controlling for offers). (C and D) Plots of the means and 95% CIs of the first and last
prices (standardized by equilibrium price) in different countries. I2 for each plot are reported in
parentheses. The distribution of the true means is displayed on the right hand side of each graph.
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Online Appendix for General Economic Principles of Bargain-
ing and Trade: Evidence from 2,000 Classroom Experiments
A Ultimatum Game
This section provides the details of ultimatum game analysis. First, we report the detection of the
discontinuous jump at equal-split offer. In addition to piecewise linear regressions, we also add
quadratic terms to test for robustness. Secondly, we compare our data with RPOZ by conducting
the analysis on both data sets. In the third section, we report the OLS regression results for
proposal offers with controlling different scenarios and demographic variables. Lastly, we analyze
the player’s reaction time, finding a drastic drop in the time Responders take to make their decisions
when they face the equal-split offer, i.e., 50 out of 100. Table S1 provides descriptive statistics for
our ultimatum game data. We summarize the configurations (pie size and number of periods) and
players’ performance in different subgroups.
Table S1: Descriptive Statistics for Ultimatum Game Data
Game Configurations # Pairs Mean S.D. Min Max
Pie Size 6505 111.6 293.0 5 5000
Total periods 6505 1.615 1.810 1 20
Performance N Proposal Offer S.D. Acceptance Rate S.D.
Overall Performance 10507 36.82 18.16 0.640 0.480
Country
US North East 1431 36.32 18.16 0.628 0.484
US Midwest 925 36.97 16.78 0.685 0.465
US South 2970 36.93 18.80 0.649 0.477
US West 2419 38.02 17.43 0.647 0.478
Canada 1057 37.58 19.65 0.667 0.472
Spain 562 31.19 15.34 0.532 0.499
England 571 37.81 16.63 0.576 0.495
Singapore 226 34.70 21.96 0.628 0.484
Japan 209 38.82 18.65 0.660 0.475
China 137 31.38 17.44 0.635 0.483
Type of School
University 9362 36.64 18.37 0.633 0.482
Liberal Arts College 688 36.44 17.73 0.688 0.464
Community College 207 42.99 12.38 0.739 0.440
1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250495 
Table S1 continued from previous page
High School 250 39.52 13.82 0.708 0.456
Type of Funding
Private School 2986 36.61 18.12 0.659 0.474
Public School 7521 36.91 18.18 0.632 0.482
Type of Class
Principles of Econ 2441 38.91 16.84 0.637 0.481
Intermediate Micro 1110 38.58 18.20 0.694 0.461
Exp. / Behav. Econ 2692 37.77 19.24 0.664 0.472
Management / Finance 938 35.88 17.93 0.630 0.483
Game Theory 2600 33.31 178.24 0.596 0.491
Political Economy 162 34.67 16.23 0.605 0.490
Other Classes 564 38.19 16.31 0.663 0.473
Time
Morning 4332 37.04 17.29 0.653 0.476
Afternoon 6175 36.67 18.73 0.631 0.483
A.1 The Detection of Discontinuous Jump
In this subsection, we provide the estimation results of the discontinuous jump. In order to check
whether there is a discontinuous jump at the 50% offer, we generate the dummy variable “Fifty or
Greater” which is one when the proposal offer is greater or equal to 50. Moreover, to check the
behavioral difference in one-shot games and repeated games, we generate another dummy variable
“one-shot” which is one when this is an one-shot scenario. The piecewise linear regression results
are summarized in Table S2.
Table S2: The Estimation Results of the Discontinuous Jump
Acceptance Rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.213 0.228 0.258 0.272
[0.018] [0.030] [0.018] [0.030]
Offer 0.010 0.009 0.0035 0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0017] [0.003]
Offer2 0.00014 0.00013
[0.00003] [0.00006]
Fifty or Greater 0.791 0.717 1.224 1.087
[0.034] [0.050] [0.227] [0.309]
Offer⇥Fifty or Greater -0.012 -0.009 -0.019 -0.015
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Table S2 continued from previous page
[0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.010]
Offer2⇥Fifty or Greater -0.00004 -0.00004
[0.00006] [0.00009]
One-Shot -0.030 -0.027
[0.034] [0.035]
One-Shot⇥Offer 0.003 0.002
[0.001] [0.003]
One-Shot⇥Offer2 0.00002
[0.00007]
One-Shot⇥Fifty or Greater 0.138 0.178
[0.068] [0.439]
One-Shot⇥Offer⇥Fifty or Greater -0.005 -0.005
[0.002] [0.014]
One-Shot⇥Offer2⇥Fifty or Greater -0.00001
[0.00012]
Discontinuous Jump (Overall) 0.214 0.166
[0.015] [0.019]
Discontinuous Jump (One-Shot) 0.163 0.106
[0.015] [0.019]
Discontinuous Jump (Repeated) 0.262 0.218
[0.028] [0.034]
R-Squared 0.2344 0.2415 0.2373 0.2445
Observations 10507 10507 10507 10507
The standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the session level (# of
clusters is 490). Moreover, we adopt Wald test for the significance of the discontin-
uous jump. Estimation results are visualized in Figure S1.
From the estimation of the first two specifications, we can see that the size of the discontinuous
jump (see Figure S1A) on average is about 21.4% (p < 0.001). When we consider data from one-
shot and repeated games separately, we observe that the discontinuous jump in repeated games
and one-shot games (see Figure S1B) are 26.2% and 16.3%, respectively (both p < 0.001).
We also adopt a quadratic specification (shown in the last two columns). The specification
estimates a 16.6% discontinuous jump (see Figure S1C). Estimating the discontinuous jump in
one-shot games and repeated games separately, we note a 10.6% jump in one-shot games, and a
21.8% jump in repeated games (see Figure S1D).
Instead of a quadratic specification, one could also further separate out offers of 50% and
run a three-part linear regression. We obtain nearly identical discontinuous jumps immediately
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before 50%, but insignificant drops immediately after. In particular, there is a discontinuous jump
of 21.7% (p < 0.001) at 50%, but an insignificant drop of 2.68% (p = 0.171) after 50% (see
Figure S1E). Consider the data separately, we obtain discontinuous jumps of 16.5% (p < 0.001)
for one-shot games and 26.5% (p < 0.001) for repeated games at 50%, and insignificant drops of
2.57% (p = 0.188) for one-shot games and 1.78% (p = 0.557) for repeated games after 50% (see
Figure S1F).
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
M
ea
n 
Ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 R
at
e 
(R
es
po
nd
er)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Proposal Offer from Proposers
Full Data
(A) Estimation in Specification (1)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
M
ea
n 
Ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 R
at
e 
(R
es
po
nd
er)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Proposal Offer from Proposers
One−Shot Game Repeated Game
(B) Estimation in Specification (2)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
M
ea
n 
Ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 R
at
e 
(R
es
po
nd
er)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Proposal Offer from Proposers
Full Data
(C) Estimation in Specification (3)
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(D) Estimation in Specification (4)
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(E) Three-Part Linear: Full Data
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(F) Three-Part Linear: One-Shot vs. Repeated
Figure S1: Visualization of the discontinuous jumps under different specifications.
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A.2 Comparison between Our Data and RPOZ
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(A) Proposal Offer in Ultimatum Game
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(B) Acceptance Rate in Ultimatum Game
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(C) Proposal Offer in RPOZ
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(D) Acceptance Rate in RPOZ
Figure S2: Proposal offers and acceptance rates in our data and RPOZ. (A) The histogram of
proposal offers in one-shot games and repeated games (with a fixed partner protocol). (B) The
average acceptance rate for different proposal offer levels, and a piecewise linear regression allowing
a discontinuous change at 50%. The size of the dots represents the frequency of each offer amount.
(C and D) The histogram of proposal offers in RPOZ, and their average acceptance rates.
In this section, we compare our results with RPOZ by conducting the same analysis. The
results of RPOZ are reproduced in Figure S2C and S2D. General patterns of both offer amounts
and acceptance rates of our data are quite similar to RPOZ except for low offers (which are made
and accepted more often) and the detection of the sharp discontinuity. Approximately 8.5% (890
out of 10,507 observations) of the offers are at the equilibrium prediction of the smallest amount or
zero, compared to only 0.3% (four out of 1,260 observations) in RPOZ. Moreover, the acceptance
rate for these equilibrium offers is 26%. In RPOZ, the discontinuous jump is only 4.5% which is
not significant.
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A.3 Proposal Offer Regression Analysis
In this subsection, we report OLS regression results for proposal offers (in percentages). Besides
geo-demographic dummy variables, we also control for different scenarios such as one-shot games
and different rounds in repeated games. Moreover, since Proposers are only allowed to make
proposal offers in integers, they are forced to round up their proposal offers when the pie size is
small. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for small pie size ( 20) to control the effect of a
more discrete choice set.
Table S3: Proposal Offer Regression Table
Proposal Offer (%) Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Constant 40.04 [1.285] 37.51 42.56
One-Shot -0.884 [0.718] -2.295 0.527
First Round Repeated Game -1.031 [0.799] -2.601 0.538
Last Round Repeated Game -0.757 [0.702] -2.137 0.622
Small Pie 4.273 [1.051] 2.208 6.339
US North East Reference Group
US Midwest -0.223 [1.333] -2.842 2.395
US South -1.604 [1.068] -3.702 0.494
US West -0.707 [1.004] -2.680 1.267
Canada 0.194 [1.173] -2.111 2.499
Spain -3.151 [2.355] -7.778 1.477
England -1.400 [2.411] -6.138 3.338
Singapore -3.182 [2.429] -7.955 1.590
Japan 0.711 [1.857] -2.937 4.359
China -5.810 [2.691] -11.10 -0.522
University Reference Group
Liberal Arts College -0.697 [1.170] -2.996 1.602
Community College 2.794 [3.591] -4.262 9.851
High School 2.161 [2.607] -2.961 7.283
Private School Reference Group
Public School 0.852 [0.900] -0.916 2.620
Principles of Econ Reference Group
Intermediate Micro -0.399 [1.296] -2.944 2.147
Exp. / Behavioral Econ -2.035 [0.869] -3.742 -0.327
Management / Finance -3.227 [1.565] -6.303 -0.152
Game Theory -5.806 [1.122] -8.011 -3.602
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Table S3 continued from previous page
Political Economy -5.163 [1.411] -7.935 -2.392
Other Classes -1.528 [1.411] -4.300 1.243
Morning Reference Group
Afternoon -0.552 [0.713] -1.953 0.850
Observations 10,507
R-Squared 0.0274
1 Small Pie is a dummy which equals to 1 if the pie size is less or equal to 20.
2 The standard errors are clustered at the session level (# of clusters is 490).
A.4 Reaction Time Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the Responders and Proposers’ RT. To control the effect of expe-
rience, we separate the data into four different scenarios: “one-shot game,” “repeated game first
round,” “repeated game non-last round” and “repeated game last round.” After all, once players
play the game repeatedly, they will be more familiar with the game and take shorter time to react.
First, we analyze Responders’ reaction time when they are facing different proposal offers
from the Proposer. To ensure our analysis is not skewed by extreme values, we drop 15 outliers
(out of 10,507 observations) that take more than 180 seconds to respond. In Figure S3, we plot
the LOWESS estimation of Responders’ reaction time for different proposal offers. In the one-shot
game scenario, we find an inverted-U shape for RT when the offer increases from 20% to 50% where
acceptance rate increases from 40% to nearly 100%. This population-level result is consistent with
the individual results of Krajbich et al. (2014) that find 16 out of 18 subjects have their average RT
peak at the offer they are indifferent when eliciting acceptance decision 3–5 times for four different
offers, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. However, RT increases are evident in all scenarios as the offer
drops below 20%, even though acceptance rates plummet. Finally, we observe there is a sharp
drop of reaction time at exactly 50% in all scenarios. For instance, in the one-shot game scenario,
Responders’ average reaction time is about 13.5 seconds when they encounter a 49% offer. Yet, it
only takes them 8.9 seconds to respond when they are facing an equal-split offer.
Secondly, we turn to analyze Proposers’ reaction time. Proposers make their decisions based
on the expected acceptance rate of different proposal offers. Therefore, here we analyze the re-
lationship between Proposers’ reaction time and the expected payoff. To ensure our analysis not
to be skewed by outliers, we exclude 40 choices (out of 10507 observations) that take more than
180 seconds to make the decision. Our results are plotted in Figure S4. Intuitively, the higher ex-
pected payoff means the proposal offer is more attractive to the Proposer. Therefore, the Proposer
should take shorter reaction time to make the decision. From the graph, we can observe that this
decreasing pattern in one-shot games and the first round of repeated games. Yet, this trend is not
obvious in other periods of repeated games.
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Figure S3: The LOWESS estimation (bandwidth equals to 0.2) of Responders’ acceptance rate
(shown in orange) and reaction time (shown in black). The acceptance rate is shown by the
vertical axis on the right and the Responders’ reaction time is presented by the vertical axis on
the left. The size of the dots represents the frequency of that proposal offer.
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Figure S4: The LOWESS estimation (bandwidth equals to 0.5) of Proposers’ expected payoff and
reaction time. The size of the dots is weighted by the frequency of the expected payoff.
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B Double Auction
In this section, we provide details of our analysis for buyer-seller double auction. We first report the
full regression table of within-period price convergence. Furthermore, we analyze how the market
would converge if the market were played multiple periods by estimating the exponential conver-
gence model. Lastly, we describe the theories and predictions of price dynamics and corresponding
descriptive statistics of relevant correlation coefficients.
One market session was excluded due to an average efficiency level of  4092.0% caused by
an input error when demonstrating the effect of a supply shift using the fairly normal supply-
demand schedule of Figure S5A. By mistyping 136 as 1136 when entering maximum seller cost, the
instructor created a 50-player market with an equilibrium quantity of merely 2 units (Figure S5B).
This extraordinary setting resulted in an average of 0.08 equilibrium trades per player, much lower
than all other markets (with at least 0.4 trades per player). With little or no financial consequences
for trading at a loss, excessive extra-marginal trades occurred that lead to negative efficiency levels
in all of the nine periods the market was repeated, ranging from  1685.1% to  6219.1%.
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Figure S5: (a) The intended supply-demand schedule to illustrate the effect of a supply shift. (b)
The extreme schedule from a supply shift where 1136 (instead of 136) was entered as maximum
seller cost. This resulted in numerous dominated trades and negative efficiency levels, something
rarely seen when subjects are incentivized with financial rewards.
In Table S4, we summarize our double auction data. In the first panel, we provide aggregate
market information. These information contains the experience of the players in the market and
the configurations. In the second panel, we provide descriptive statistics market performance,
including mean error deviation ( ), Smith’s alpha (↵), and efficiency (E) in different subgroups.
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Table S4: Descriptive Statistics for Double Auction Data
Market Information # Markets Mean S.D. Median Min Max
# of Players 5809 14.11 15.43 10 2 318
Non-Robot Experience 5809 2.529 2.781 1.7 0 32.33
Robot Experience 5809 0.245 0.634 0 0 11.67
Total Periods 5809 1.553 0.959 1 1 10
Welfare Index 5809 0.188 0.111 0.231 0 0.901
Market Performance N  ¯ S.D. ↵ S.D. E S.D.
Overall Performance 9023 0.070 0.280 0.279 0.294 0.815 0.258
Country
US North East 1038 0.044 0.203 0.234 0.204 0.824 0.167
US Midwest 881 0.063 0.244 0.290 0.286 0.803 0.230
US South 2547 0.041 0.301 0.248 0.336 0.811 0.385
US West 2218 0.021 0.200 0.264 0.204 0.822 0.196
Canada 1664 0.209 0.377 0.393 0.374 0.836 0.143
Spain 28 -0.058 0.258 0.274 0.199 0.860 0.228
England 320 0.041 0.130 0.210 0.162 0.727 0.156
Singapore 44 -0.005 0.128 0.201 0.139 0.780 0.166
Japan 248 0.055 0.200 0.238 0.208 0.753 0.238
China 35 0.066 0.098 0.136 0.068 0.848 0.163
Type of School
University 8368 0.074 0.285 0.279 0.299 0.812 0.264
Liberal Arts College 523 0.010 0.161 0.243 0.178 0.864 0.149
Community College 65 0.069 0.426 0.534 0.353 0.695 0.259
High School 67 -0.063 0.184 0.272 0.196 0.885 0.135
Type of Funding
Private School 1769 0.026 0.196 0.233 0.213 0.810 0.450
Public School 7254 0.080 0.296 0.290 0.309 0.816 0.183
Type of Class
Principles of Econ 6490 0.074 0.262 0.279 0.266 0.816 0.273
Intermediate Micro 1045 0.080 0.426 0.314 0.472 0.814 0.242
Intermediate Macro 249 0.024 0.247 0.268 0.253 0.817 0.187
Exp. / Behav. Econ 437 0.037 0.187 0.218 0.197 0.800 0.210
Management / Finance 452 0.051 0.234 0.263 0.265 0.791 0.216
Game Theory 20 -0.057 0.226 0.295 0.175 0.814 0.216
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Table S4 continued from previous page
Political Economy 2 0.766 0.701 1.030 0.433 0.605 0.047
Other Classes 328 0.048 0.214 0.272 0.220 0.838 0.144
Time
Morning 783 0.072 0.330 0.321 0.361 0.789 0.334
Afternoon 8240 0.069 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.817 0.250
1 Non-Robot Experience: The average number of trading periods that the players played
with only humans before this market starts.
2 Robot Experience: The average number of periods that the players played in the market
including robot players before this market starts.
3 Welfare Index: w = |⇧c  ⇧p|/(⇧c +⇧p), where ⇧c and ⇧p are the total consumer and
producer surplus. We construct this variable to control the configuration.
4 Mean Error Deviation is defined as  ¯ = 1Q
PQ
q=1  q, which is the average standardized
price difference.
B.1 Within-Period Convergence
We follow Noussair et al. (1995) to estimate the convergence of price within a transaction period:
yit = (1/t)Xi ·  1 + (1  1/t) 2 + ✏it
where i indicates the particular period of market, t represents time as measured by the transaction
order, Xi contains the information about that period of market, and  1 explains the origin of the
dynamic process. Therefore,  2 is the asymptote of the dependent variable.
We take standardized price difference, which is the difference of transaction price and equilib-
rium price divided by the equilibrium price, as the dependent variable. Table S5 shows that prices
initially are 15.3% higher than equilibrium prices, but eventually drop to only 1.7% higher. This
shows strong convergence within the period.
Table S5: Estimation Result of Within-Period Price Convergence
Coef. Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Initial Price Variation:
Constant 0.153 [0.075] 0.006 0.299
Non-Robot Experience 0.013 [0.004] 0.004 0.021
Robot Experience 0.011 [0.018] -0.025 0.047
Period -0.010 [0.009] -0.028 0.008
Welfare Index -3.477 [1.026] -5.489 -1.465
Welfare Index Sq. 11.74 [3.317] 5.239 18.25
# of Players -0.001 [0.001] -0.003 0.001
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Table S5 continued from previous page
US North East Reference Group
US Midwest 0.100 [0.054] -0.007 0.206
US South -0.048 [0.041] -0.128 0.032
US West -0.087 [0.047] -0.180 0.005
Canada 0.217 [0.059] 0.102 0.332
Spain -0.211 [0.113] -0.433 0.011
England -0.053 [0.071] -0.192 0.086
Singapore -0.114 [0.272] -0.647 0.419
Japan -0.044 [0.074] -0.188 0.100
China -0.046 [0.093] -0.228 0.135
University Reference Group
Liberal Arts College -0.018 [0.040] -0.097 0.062
Community College 0.145 [0.078] -0.008 0.299
High School -0.146 [0.078] -0.299 0.007
Private School Reference Group
Public School 0.033 [0.032] -0.030 0.095
Principles of Econ Reference Group
Intermediate Micro 0.042 [0.043] -0.043 0.126
Intermediate Macro 0.012 [0.043] -0.072 0.096
Exp. / Behavioral Econ 0.064 [0.058] -0.050 0.177
Management / Finance 0.071 [0.037] -0.002 0.143
Game Theory -0.049 [0.125] -0.295 0.197
Other Classes 0.026 [0.044] -0.059 0.112
Morning Reference Group
Afternoon 0.030 [0.041] -0.051 0.111
Ending Point:
Asymptote 0.017 [0.006] 0.006 0.028
Observations 138,898
R-Squared 0.0966
The standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the session
level (# of clusters is 1672). To compute the clustered standard errors,
we drop two market observations for Political Economy class since they
are from the same market session.
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B.2 Between-Period Convergence
We analyze how markets would converge if they were played multiple times. In particular, we
follow the approach in Gjerstad (2007) to analyze the convergence of volatility and efficiency using
an exponential convergence model. The convergence of the dependent variable is modeled as:
y(t) = c · t b⌘(t)
where y(t) is the dependent variable at period t and ⌘(t) is the random error assumed to be
independent and lognormally distributed. Once we take logarithm on both sides, we can express
the exponential model as the following linear model:
ln[y(t)] = ln(c)  b · ln(t) + ✏(t)
where ✏(t) is the random error following a normal distribution. Notice that since y(1) = c, cˆ
would be the estimation of starting point and bˆ is the estimation of the speed of convergence. The
estimation results of Smith’s alpha (↵(t)) and efficiency loss (1  E(t)) are shown in Table S6.
Table S6: Estimation Result of Exponential Convergence Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ↵(t) ↵(t) 1  E(t) 1  E(t)
cˆ 0.225 0.206 0.101 0.077
[0.004] [0.016] [0.003] [0.012]
bˆ 0.292 0.270 -0.067 -0.012
[0.029] [0.025] [0.053] [0.049]
↵ˆ(25) 0.088 0.086
[0.008] [0.009]
1  Eˆ(25) 0.125 0.081
[0.021] [0.016]
Controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 9,021 9,021 9,021 9,021
R-squared 0.032 0.129 0.001 0.042
The standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the
session level (# of clusters is 1672). To compute the clustered
standard errors, We drop two market observations for Political
Economy class since they are from the same market session. The
controls contain the experience, number of players in the mar-
ket, welfare index (and squared), countries, school types, funding
types, class types and time.
The result shows that the initial point of Smith’s alpha is 20.6% (22.5% without controls) and
the efficiency loss is 7.7% (10.1% without controls), which are both significantly different from zero.
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The significance of bˆ for Smith’s alpha shows a convergence trend. However, no convergence trend
can be not found for efficiency loss. Based on these results, we can estimate Smith’s alpha and
efficiency loss if the market were played 25 periods. Price volatility in period 25 is estimated to be
8.6% (8.8% without controls) and efficiency loss is predicted to be 8.1% (12.5% without controls).
This suggests that price volatility decreases as the market lasts more periods, but efficiency remains
stable across periods.
B.3 Theories of Price Formation
In this section, we describe three theories of within-period price dynamics and provide correspond-
ing theoretical predictions. These theories are the “Mutual Adjustment” (MA) model of Wilson
(1987), the “Against Nature” (AN) model of Friedman (1991), and the zero-intelligence algorithm
(ZI) proposed by Gode and Sunder (1993). Here we only summarize predictions that we test. A
more detailed comparison can be found in Cason and Friedman (1996). For between-period price
dynamics, we briefly describe Easley and Ledyard (1993).
Mutual Adjustment (MA)
Wilson (1987) extends the bilateral bargaining model between a buyer and a seller to the context
of multilateral markets. Hence, price dynamics in the double auction is viewed as a sequential
equilibrium of an extensive-form game where the buyers’ values and the sellers’ costs are drawn
from a commonly known joint distribution. Under this framework, buyers and sellers play a
waiting game where players’ impatience arises from the pressure of missing a profitable transaction.
Eventually, this impatience induces some trader to make a bid or ask that has a positive probability
to be accepted in the sequential equilibrium. If the transaction does not happen immediately, the
trader would improve the offer until it is accepted. This improvement process is like a Dutch
auction. Based on this model, we have the following testable predictions:
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers (sellers) with higher values (lower costs) should transact
earlier. That is, the rank-order correlation of buyer’s value (seller’s cost) and transaction
order should be negative (positive). Moreover, once we assume risk neutrality and symmetry,
the rank-order correlation coefficient ⇢Buyer (⇢Seller) should be exactly  1.0 (1.0).
2. Price Dynamics: Price changes are serially uncorrelated. Therefore, the first-order price
change auto-correlation coefficient ⇢Price is predicted to be 0 in this model.
Against Nature (AN)
Friedman (1991) models the price formation process in double auctions as a Bayesian game against
nature. This framework aligns with the Bertrand perspective that traders would accept the market
offer once it exceeds their own reservation price. Furthermore, traders are assumed to neglect
strategic feedback effects—they ignore the impact of their own bids and asks on other players’
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strategies. Under this construction, the traders’ problem can be transformed into solving the
optimal stopping point with respect to Nature’s bid and ask generating process. The reservation
price solves the problem in equilibrium. This theory implies that the transaction order should be
in order of the buyer and seller’s value and cost, and price change is positively auto-correlated.
These two testable predictions are listed below.
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers (sellers) with higher values (lower costs) should transact
earlier. That is, the rank-order correlation of buyer’s value (seller’s cost) and transaction
order should be negative (positive). Moreover, if we assume risk neutrality and symmetry,
the rank-order correlation coefficient ⇢Buyer (⇢Seller) should be exactly  1.0 (1.0).
2. Price Dynamics: Price changes are positively auto-correlated. Therefore, the first-order price
change auto-correlation coefficient ⇢Price is predicted to be positive in this model.
Zero-Intelligence (ZI)
To show how efficient the double auction mechanism is, Gode and Sunder (1993) developed a
“zero-intelligence algorithm” where buyers and sellers make random bids and asks (but avoid losing
money). Specifically, the buyer’s bid is uniformly distributed from 0 to the buyer’s value. Similarly,
the seller’s ask is uniformly distributed from the upper bound to the cost. The construction of
ZI algorithm implies that the transaction prices are independently drawn from a distribution that
would change as transactions occur. Since bids and asks are completely random in this environment,
there is no precise prediction. Yet, we can still infer from the algorithm that it is slightly more
likely that buyers with higher values and sellers with lower costs would trade earlier (because they
can accept offers from a wider range). Moreover, if we assume that transaction prices come from
a fixed distribution, the price change auto-correlation coefficient is exactly  0.511.
Although there is no clear prediction about the rank order correlation coefficients and the price
change auto-correlation, we follow Cason and Friedman (1996) and simulate the algorithm in our
default setting for 10,000 times. The simulation result is shown in Figure S6 and the blue circles
indicate 95% confidence regions. In this simulation data set, the mean of ⇢price is  0.475 (S.D.
= 0.211). On the other hand, the mean of ⇢Buyer and ⇢Seller are  0.402 (S.D. = 0.152) and 0.440
(S.D. = 0.127), respectively. Thus, implications of ZI algorithm are:
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers with higher values and the sellers with lower costs would
be slightly more likely to trade earlier. 10,000 simulations predict ⇢Buyer =  0.402 and
⇢Seller = 0.440.
11Suppose transaction prices pq , q 2 {1, . . . Q} are IID with variance V . We can normalize pq such that E(pq) = 0.
Therefore, V = E(p2q) and E(pqpq+1) = E(pq)E(pq+1) = 0. In this case, the price change auto-correlation coefficient
would be
⇢price =
E[(pq+1   pq)(pq   pq 1)]
E[(pq+1   pq)2] =
 E(p2q)
E(p2q+1) + E(p2q)
=
 V
2V
=  0.5.
After some traders complete the transactions and leave the market, the distribution of prices would change. Yet,
the changes in distribution would only have a small effect on ⇢price.
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2. Price Dynamics: The price change auto-correlation coefficient is predicted (by 10,000 simu-
lations) to be ⇢Price =  0.475.
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Figure S6: Zero-Intelligence algorithm simulation result.
Between-Period Price Formation
Easley and Ledyard (1993) postulate traders use the price range of last period to form reservation
prices they bid up to in a reduced-form English auction in the current period, but then adjust to
their true values or costs if they fail to make a trade. This model predicts a sequence of decreasing
price ranges across periods, resulting in a distributional shift of rank order correlation between
periods. Hence, we have:
1. Transaction Partner: The buyers (sellers) with higher values (lower costs) should transact
earlier, but this early tendency diminishes across periods.
2. Price Dynamics: No prediction for within-period price dynamics (since this is a between-
period theory).
B.4 Descriptive Statistics for Price Formation Indices
In Table S7, we provide the descriptive statistics of ⇢Price, ⇢Buyer and ⇢Seller in different groups.
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Table S7: Descriptive Statistics for Price Formation Indices
Correlation Coefficient N ⇢Price S.D. ⇢Buyer S.D. ⇢Seller S.D.
Overall Performance 8492 -0.431 0.313 -0.539 0.277 0.518 0.279
Country
US North East 965 -0.440 0.362 -0.507 0.307 0.496 0.297
US Midwest 826 -0.427 0.266 -0.544 0.219 0.513 0.241
US South 2418 -0.425 0.326 -0.552 0.278 0.541 0.279
US West 2144 -0.422 0.284 -0.521 0.285 0.513 0.286
Canada 1620 -0.444 0.306 -0.572 0.254 0.519 0.267
Spain 24 -0.459 0.294 -0.232 0.487 0.263 0.526
England 311 -0.454 0.251 -0.547 0.212 0.498 0.214
Singapore 42 -0.429 0.244 -0.525 0.185 0.466 0.260
Japan 108 -0.428 0.595 -0.370 0.480 0.493 0.411
China 34 -0.415 0.329 -0.553 0.251 0.508 0.315
Type of School
University 7865 -0.433 0.313 -0.536 0.278 0.514 0.280
Liberal Arts College 510 -0.410 0.301 -0.577 0.257 0.582 0.231
Community College 50 -0.445 0.402 -0.520 0.237 0.533 0.291
High School 67 -0.389 0.303 -0.527 0.361 0.501 0.390
Type of Funding
Private School 1656 -0.422 0.324 -0.555 0.286 0.532 0.277
Public School 6836 -0.433 0.310 -0.535 0.275 0.515 0.279
Type of Class
Principles of Econ 6262 -0.432 0.303 -0.544 0.268 0.524 0.269
Intermediate Micro 974 -0.424 0.312 -0.567 0.246 0.556 0.242
Intermediate Macro 228 -0.447 0.312 -0.517 0.281 0.505 0.310
Exp. / Behav. Econ 287 -0.444 0.444 -0.444 0.402 0.444 0.404
Management / Finance 422 -0.417 0.330 -0.521 0.302 0.471 0.307
Game Theory 19 -0.402 0.280 -0.597 0.163 0.443 0.289
Political Economy 1 -0.275 – -0.75 – 0.607 –
Other Classes 299 -0.415 0.343 -0.463 0.336 0.430 0.345
Time
Morning 733 -0.434 0.294 -0.539 0.280 0.509 0.266
Afternoon 7759 -0.431 0.315 -0.539 0.277 0.519 0.280
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C Heterogeneity Analysis
We report details of the cross-country heterogeneity analysis in this section. We analyze the
heterogeneity in the first period of the default configuration for both ultimatum game and double
auction to control for experience and experimental setup. In the ultimatum game, we analyze the
heterogeneity in proposal offers and acceptance rates. On the other hand, in double auctions, we
study the heterogeneity of the first and the last price in a market period.
We apply the DerSimonian-Laird random-effects model of meta-analysis, and calculate the
I2 statistic, which shows the proportion of the variability from between-country heterogeneity.
Table S8, S10, S12 and S14 report the means and 95% CIs in each country for proposal offer,
acceptance rate, first transaction price and last transaction price, respectively. Table S9, S11, S13
and S15 report (for the same four indices) measures of heterogeneity, including the I2 statistic, the
estimated variance of the true means ⌧ˆ2, as well as the p-value for the null hypothesis of having
no between-country heterogeneity.
Specifically, under the framework of random-effect model, the mean of country k is
mk = (µ+ ⇣k) + ek,
where µ is the true overall mean, ek is the within-country variation (with standard error sk), in-
dependent of the variation of country means which is assumed to be ⇣k ⇠ N(0, ⌧2). This provides
the marginal distributions mk ⇠ N(µ, s2k + ⌧2). In other words, the random-effect model assumes
the variation in country means comes from not only sampling error, but also underlying popula-
tion heterogeneity (between-country variation ⇣k).12 Thus, our goal is to quantify the fraction of
variation resulting from between-country heterogeneity.
To estimate the fraction, we first need to estimate ⌧2 and then the true overall mean µ. We
follow the approach of DerSimonian and Laird (1986) and adopt the method of moments to estimate
⌧ˆ2. This is the simplest and most commonly used approach in meta-analysis. This method is
essentially the method of moments which requires to calculate the Q statistic:
Q =
KX
k=1
wk
"
mk  
PK
k=1 wkmkPK
k=1 wk
#2
,
where K is the number of countries in our data set and wk = 1s2k . Under the assumption of
random-effect model, we can obtain that
E(Q) =
 
KX
k=1
wk  
PK
k=1 w
2
kPK
k=1 wk
! 
⌧2 + s2k
 
= (K   1) +
 
KX
k=1
wk  
PK
k=1 w
2
kPK
k=1 wk
!
⌧2.
As we plug-in the moment condition, we can obtain
Q = (K   1) +
 
KX
k=1
wk  
PK
k=1 w
2
kPK
k=1 wk
!
⌧ˆ2DL.
12In the fixed-effect model, the variation is assumed to be purely from the sampling error, so the model reduces
to mk = µ+ ek.
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Rearranging the moment condition of ⌧2, we can obtain the DerSimonian and Laird estimate
⌧ˆ2DL =
Q  (K   1)PK
k=1 wk  
PK
k=1 w
2
kPK
k=1 wk
.
By convention, ⌧ˆ2DL is replaced with 0 if Q < K   1. Once we obtain ⌧ˆ2DL, we can therefore plug
it into the other moment condition, E
hPK
k=1 w
⇤
kmkPK
k=1 w
⇤
k
i
= µ for w⇤k =
1
s2k+⌧
2 , and obtain
µˆDL =
PK
k=1 wˆ
⇤
kmkPK
k=1 wˆ
⇤
k
,
where wˆ⇤k =
1
s2k+⌧ˆ
2
DL
. Moreover, we can obtain the confidence intervals by using the approximation
µˆDL ⇠ N
 
µ,
1PK
k=1 wˆ
⇤
k
!
.
After obtaining the estimators of the between-country variance ⌧ˆ2DL and the overall mean µˆDL,
we can now further compute the fraction of between-country variation among observed variation.
Intuitively, suppose the sampling errors in different countries are the same, i.e. sk = s, then the
unconditional variance of country k is given by
var(mk) = ⌧
2 + s2.
Therefore, the fraction of variance that is due to between-country heterogeneity is
i2 =
⌧2
⌧2 + s2
,
which is the true value that we want to estimate. If i2 > 0, then the true means of different
countries are indeed heterogeneous. Here we follow Higgins and Thompson (2002), defining the I2
statistic to be of the form
I2 =
⌧ˆ2DL
⌧ˆ2DL + sˆ
2
,
where sˆ2 is an estimate of s2. In the general case, the sampling errors in different countries would
be different. That is, the s2 would be replaced with a set of sampling errors {s1, s2, · · · , sK}. In
this case, Higgins and Thompson (2002) suggest that we can plug in
sˆ2 =
K   1PK
k=1 wk  
PK
k=1 w
2
kPK
k=1 wk
.
After defining the I2 statistic, we can rewrite the definition and obtain the following form:
I2 =
✓
Q  (K   1)
Q
◆
⇥ 100%,
which is set to be 0 if Q < K   1. Intuitively, Q statistic reflects the total amount of observed
variation, and K   1 is the expectation of Q if there is no between-country heterogeneity (⌧ = 0).
Thus, Q   (K   1) is the amount of excess variation, and I2 is the fraction of variation that is
from between-country heterogeneity. Lastly, K   1 is actually the degree of freedom (df). As we
replace K   1 with df , we can obtain the form of I2 in Higgins et al. (2003):
I2 =
✓
Q  df
Q
◆
⇥ 100%.
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C.1 Proposal Offer
Table S8: Proposal Offers in Different Countries
Countries Mean [95% C.I. ] Weight (%)
Spain 27.73 25.42 30.04 10.36
China 30.83 26.16 35.50 5.90
US Midwest 35.18 33.73 36.64 12.18
US North East 35.20 34.01 36.38 12.66
Singapore 35.50 30.06 40.94 4.90
England 35.92 33.07 38.77 9.19
US South 36.19 35.28 37.09 13.10
Japan 36.64 32.35 40.93 6.48
Canada 37.30 35.89 38.71 12.26
US West 37.35 36.35 38.35 12.96
Overall Effect 35.00 33.50 36.51 100.00
Table S9: Heterogeneity Measures of Proposal Offers
Q df p-value I2(%) [95% C.I. ] ⌧ˆ2
67.20 9 0.000 86.61 77.31 92.10 4.26
The results of Table S8 and S9 show that a significant amount of between-country heterogeneity
exists in proposal offers (p < 0.001). In particular, 86.61% of the variation comes from between-
country heterogeneity, and the estimated variance of the true effect size is 4.26.
C.2 Acceptance Rate
To compare conditional acceptance rates, we employ the estimated coefficients of the following
logistic regression:
g(yi) = ↵ · offeri +
10X
j=1
 jDji + ✏i
where g(·) is the logit function and Dji is the dummy variable of each countries. After running the
regression, we compare the heterogeneity in the estimations of country dummy variables. Notice
that the standard errors are calculated by clustering at the session level.
The acceptance rate results of Table S10 and S11 show insignificant between-country hetero-
geneity (p = 0.164). In fact, only 30.63% of the variation comes from between-country heterogene-
ity, and the estimated variance of the true effect size is only 0.012.
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Table S10: Estimations of Country Dummy Variables in the Logistic Regression
Country Mean [95% C.I. ] Weight (%)
England -1.79 -2.09 -1.50 11.61
US West -1.74 -2.00 -1.48 13.65
Canada -1.57 -1.88 -1.26 10.96
Spain -1.57 -1.97 -1.17 7.40
Japan -1.57 -1.96 -1.18 7.75
US South -1.52 -1.75 -1.30 15.88
US North East -1.43 -1.69 -1.17 13.37
US Midwest -1.29 -1.58 -0.99 11.65
China -1.14 -1.76 -0.52 3.53
Singapore -1.08 -1.64 -0.52 4.21
Overall Effect -1.52 -1.65 -1.40 100.00
Table S11: Heterogeneity Measures of Acceptance Rates
Q df p-value I2(%) [95% C.I. ] ⌧ˆ2
12.97 9 0.164 30.63 0.00 66.85 0.012
C.3 First Transaction
Table S12: First Standardized Price Difference in Different Countries
Country Mean [95% C.I. ] Weight (%)
Spain -0.22 -0.65 0.20 0.40
Singapore -0.15 -0.73 0.44 0.22
US South -0.02 -0.05 0.00 31.06
US West -0.02 -0.07 0.02 21.15
England -0.01 -0.14 0.13 3.91
US North East 0.01 -0.05 0.07 13.17
China 0.04 -0.11 0.18 3.22
Canada 0.04 -0.01 0.09 18.61
Japan 0.08 -0.17 0.32 1.21
US Midwest 0.09 -0.01 0.18 7.04
Overall Effect 0.00 -0.02 0.03 100.00
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Table S13: Heterogeneity Measures of First Standardized Price Difference
Q df p-value I2(%) [95% C.I. ] ⌧ˆ2
12.38 9 0.193 27.28 0.00 65.05 0.00
Table S12 and S13 show that between-country heterogeneity in the first transaction price is not
significant (p = 0.193). Moreover, most of the variation comes from within-country variance—only
27.28% of the variation is from between-country heterogeneity. In fact, the overall average is not
significantly different from 0, ranging from  22% to 9%. Lastly, the estimated variance of the true
effect size is less than 0.01.
C.4 Last Transaction
The last transaction results of Table S14 and S15 show that the between-country heterogeneity is
also not significant (p = 0.276). Most of the variation is still from within-country variance—only
18.16% of the variation comes from between-country heterogeneity, with mean effects ranging from
 2% to 12%. Lastly, the estimated variance of the true effect size is also less than 0.01.
Table S14: Last Standardized Price Difference in Different Countries
Country Mean [95% C.I. ] Weight (%)
US South -0.02 -0.04 -0.00 34.17
US West -0.01 -0.04 0.01 22.74
Singapore 0.00 -0.27 0.27 0.28
US North East 0.00 -0.03 0.04 15.88
England 0.02 -0.08 0.11 2.36
China 0.02 -0.04 0.09 4.35
Canada 0.02 -0.01 0.06 14.83
US Midwest 0.03 -0.04 0.10 4.52
Spain 0.13 -0.20 0.45 0.20
Japan 0.13 -0.05 0.30 0.68
Overall Effect -0.00 -0.02 0.01 100.00
Table S15: Heterogeneity Measures of Last Standardized Price Difference
Q df p-value I2(%) [95% C.I. ] ⌧ˆ2
11.00 9 0.276 18.16 0.00 59.08 0.00
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D Games
(A) Proposer Initial Screen (B) Proposer Decision Screen
(C) Proposer Result Screen (D) Responder Decision Screen
(E) Responder Result Screen
Figure S7: Screenshots in each stage of the ultimatum game
In this section, we provide the screenshots of each stage in our ultimatum game and buyer-seller
double auction. Figure S7 shows screenshots in the ultimatum game. The Proposers’ screenshots
are S7A to S7C. At the beginning of the game, the Proposer would see the amount of money that
he can split with the Responder. The Proposer then can drag the ball in the middle of the screen
to make the proposal. After the Responder makes a decision, the Proposer would see the result
screen. Figure S7C is a sample result screen that the player sees if the proposal offer is rejected.
The Responder’s screenshots are shown in Figure S7D and S7E. After the Proposer makes the
proposal offer, the Responder would see the proposed allocation and decides whether to accept or
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reject it through the buttons on the screen. After the decision is made, the players would see the
result screen and Figure S7E is a sample result screen when the proposal offer is accepted.
(A) Buyers’ Initial Screen (B) Buyers’ Transaction Screen
(C) Buyers’ Result Screen (D) Sellers’ Initial Screen
(E) Sellers’ Transaction Screen (F) Sellers’ Result Screen
Figure S8: Screenshots in each stage of the buyer-seller double auction
In the buyer-seller double auction, the buyers’ initial screenshot is shown in Figure S8A and
the sellers’ initial screenshot is in S8D. Both buyers and sellers would see their values/costs of
the commodities as they enter the market. Then, buyers and sellers can trade in the market by
either dragging the slider bar to make an offer or clicking the button to accept the standing offer
(Figure S8B for buyers). Notice that if a player is making a potential trade that would give them
negative payoff, the slider bar would turn red as a warning signal (Figure S8E for sellers). After a
transaction occurs, the player would see the result screen which shows the price and profit of that
transaction. Figure S8C and Figure S8F are the result screens for buyers and sellers, respectively.
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